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7 Protectionist U. S. Trade Policy 
and Korean Exports 
Chong-Hyun Nam 
Since the end of World War 11, tariff barriers to trade in manufactures have 
been almost eliminated in most of the advanced industrial countries (AICs) 
through successive rounds of trade negotiations in the GATT. The shift into a 
more open international trading system, which was chiefly led by the United 
States, not only brought about unprecedented growth of the world economy 
but also produced an environment in which some developing countries 
emerged as significant exporters of labor-intensive manufactures, the newly 
industrializing economies (NIEs). The Republic of Korea is well known as a 
successful front-runner among the NIEs in that regard. 
As the world economic climate changed for the worse, however, beginning 
with the first oil crisis in 1973-74 and culminating with the second oil price 
increase in 1979-80, protectionist pressures grew tremendously in most of 
the AICs. Because the already low tariffs in the AICs are mostly bound by the 
GATT, nontariff barriers (NTBs) have become the main method of protection 
in the AICs. Recent studies indicate that the United States has been one of the 
leading nations in applying the NTBs, and the major export items of the 
developing countries, notably of the NIEs, have been the prime target of 
those actions (see, e.g., Nogues, Olechowski, and Winters 1985; Finger 
and Nogues 1987; and Nam 1987). In this paper, the nature and extent of trade 
restriction measures undertaken by the United States and their effects on Ko- 
rean exports to the United States during the 1980s are examined. 
The paper will begin with a brief description of the development of trade 
between Korea and the United States. This will be followed by the review of 
protectionist elements embedded in the current U.S. trade laws. Then an at- 
tempt will be made to examine the pattern of the U.S. NTBs and their effects 
Chong-Hyun Nam is professor of economics at Korea University. 
183 
184 Chong-Hyun Nam 
on Korean exports. Finally, policy implications for Korea will be considered 
in a concluding section. 
7.1 Bade Development between Korea and the United States 
During the past quarter century, Korea’s strong performance in exports has 
been the principal factor behind its successful growth and industrialization. 
As can be seen from table 7.1, exports exploded from $1 19 million in 1964 to 
$62.4 billion in 1989, with an average annual growth rate of 28.5 percent in 
nominal value. The ratio of exports to GNP was only 4.3 percent in 1964 but 
rose rapidly to 29.7 percent in 1989. As a result, Korea has become a major 
exporting nation, ranking eleventh in the world with a share of 2.1 percent in 
total world exports in 1989. 
Rapid expansion of exports has accompanied the rapid growth of real GNP, 
and this in turn has brought fundamental changes in all sectors of the econ- 
omy. Real GNP in Korea increased nearly thirteenfold between 1964 and 
1988, with an annual growth rate of 10.7 percent. The rapid expansion of 
Table 7.1 Major Economic Indicators of the Korean Economy, 1964-89 
1964 1974 1989 1964-74” 1974-89’ 1964-89’ 
Population (million) 
GNP (in billion won)” 
Per capita GNP: 
in thousand wonb 
in U S .  dollarsc 
Sectoral value added (share of 
GNP, %): 
Primary industry 
Manufacturing 
Services and social overhead 
Sectoral employment (share of 
total labor force, %): 
Primary industry 
Manufacturing 
Services and social overhead 
Exports and imports: 
Commodity exports, f.0.b. 
(in million U.S. dollars) 
Ratio of exports to GNP 
Commodity imports, f.0.b. 
(in million U.S. dollars) 
Ratio of imports to GNP 
28.0 34.7 42.4 2.2 1.3 1.7 
9,449 24,207 119,577 9.9 11.2 10.7 
337 698 2,822 7.6 9.8 8.9 
102 540 4.968 
47.6 25.7 10.8 
10.5 27.4 31.3 
41.9 46.9 57.9 
62.5 48.4 20.1 
8.2 17.3 27.6 
29.3 34.3 52.3 
119 4,460 62,377 43.7 19.2 28.5 
4.3 28.5 29.7 
365 6,852 61,465 34.1 15.7 22.8 
13.3 43.8 29.3 
Source: Economic Planning Board, Major Statistics of Korean Economy (various years). 
’Based on current prices. 
bAverage annual growth rate. 
‘Based on 1985 prices. 
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exports was achieved mainly by the increase in production of manufactured 
goods since the early 1960s. Exports of manufactured goods accounted for 
only 51.1 percent of total exports in 1964 but increased to 94.5 percent by 
1989. As a result, the manufacturing sector’s share in GNP increased from 
10.5 percent in 1964 to 31.3 percent in 1989, whereas the share of agriculture 
decreased from 47.6 to 10.8 percent for the same period. 
Ever since Korea began its outward-oriented economic development in the 
mid-l960s, access to the U.S. market has been critical to Korea’s export suc- 
cess. The United States took as much as 47.3 percent of Korea’s total exports 
in 1970 but only 26.3 percent in 1980 (see table 7.2). The absorption by the 
United States of Korea’s exports rose again to 29.8 percent in 1990. At the 
same time, the United States was the second largest supplier of imports, next 
to Japan, in the Korean market in 1970 with a share of 29.5 percent of Korea’s 
total imports. The U.S. share in Korea’s import markets steadily declined to 
21.9 percent in 1980, but rose again to 24.3 percent in 1990. 
The relative importance of Korea to the United States both as a purchaser 
of U.S. exports and as a supplier for the U.S. market is not nearly as great, 
but that is changing rapidly. Korea took less than 1 percent of total U.S. ex- 
ports in 1970, but it took 3.9 percent in 1990. Meanwhile, although Korea 
supplied less than 1.4 percent of total U.S. imports in 1970, it supplied more 
than 4.3 percent in 1990. As a result, the bilateral trade volume between the 
two countries has increased from a mere $980 million in 1970 to more than 
$36 billion in 1990, surpassing the volume between the United States and 
Table 7.2 Bade Dependency between Korea and the United States, 1970-90 (million 
U.S. dollars) 
1970 1980 I990 1970-80’ 1980-90’ 
Korea’s exports to the U.S.b 395 4,607 19,360 27.8 15.4 
Share (%) in Korea’s ex- 
Share (%) in U.S. im- 
Korea’s imports from the 
Ports 47.3 26.3 29.8 
ports .9 1.8 3.9 
U.S.b 585 4,890 16,942 23.7 13.2 
Share (%) in Korea’s im- 
Share (70) in U.S. ex- 
Ports 29.5 21.9 24.3 
ports 1.4 2.2 4.3 
Korea’s trade balance 
Korea’s trade balance 
against the U.S. - 190 - 284 2,418 
against worldb -1,149 -4,787 -4,828 
Source: Korea Foreign Trade Association, Major Statistics of Korea Economy, 1990. 
‘Average annual growth rates are given in percentages. 
bAll measures are in customs clearance base. 
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France and between the United States and Italy early in the 1980s. Since 
1983, Korea has been the seventh largest trading partner of the United States, 
standing behind only Canada, Japan, Mexico, West Germany, Taiwan, and 
the United Kingdom. 
The relative dependence between Korea and the United States in trade is, 
therefore, quite a contrast. When measured by the ratio of bilateral trade vol- 
ume to each country’s total trade volume, Korea’s dependence on the U.S. 
market represented more than 27 percent in 1990, whereas the U.S. depen- 
dence on Korea’s market was merely 4.1 percent. The relative dependence of 
each country can be contrasted even more when measured by the ratio of bi- 
lateral trade volume to GNP in each country. The ratio is estimated at 16.2 
percent for Korea but only 0.7 percent for the United States. This vividly 
illustrates how much each country can hurt the other by introducing new pro- 
tectionist measures. This also indicates how much bargaining leverage each 
country may have when each other’s market is being held hostage in bilateral 
trade negotiations. 
The dependence of Korean exports on the U.S. market has been more criti- 
cal in some of the leading export sectors than in others. Table 7.3 presents the 
shares of Korea’s major export items going to the United States. In 1988, the 
United States took more than 50 percent of Korean exports in road vehicles, 
footwear, and data-processing machines. The United States also received 
more than 30 percent of Korean exports in apparel and clothing, metal prod- 
ucts, telecommunications apparatus, and electrical machineries. On the other 
hand, Korea relied on the United States to supply more than 60 percent of its 
imports of transport equipment (including aircraft), cereal, furskins, and pulp 
products. Korea also relied on imports from the United States for more than 
one-quarter of its imports of electrical machinery, organic chemicals, metal- 
liferous ores, and textile fibers. Thus, Korean exports to the United States 
tend to be mostly labor-intensive consumer goods, whereas Korean imports 
from the United States comprise mostly resource-based raw materials, includ- 
ing agricultural products and highly sophisticated capital goods. 
While bilateral trade between the two countries grew tremendously in size, 
the bilateral trade balance was persistently in favor of the United States until 
198 1. It shifted into Korea’s favor beginning in 1982 and has since grown to 
a significant magnitude, reaching a peak at $9.7 billion in 1987. Since then, 
however, Korea’s bilateral trade surplus against the United States decreased 
significantly to $2.4 billion by 1990. Partly owing to its rising bilateral trade 
surplus against the United States, and partly owing to an accelerated increase 
in the domestic savings rate as a result of rapid economic growth, Korea began 
to register an overall trade surplus beginning in 1986. Such a successful trans- 
formation into a trade surplus economy from a long debt-ridden deficit econ- 
omy has, however, been met by industrial countries, notably by the United 
States, with an increased level of protection. The overall trade balance of Ko- 
rea moved into the red again in 1990. 
Table 7.3 Korea's Major Exports to and Imports from the United States, 1988 (million U.S. dollars) 
Exports Imports 
Value Value 
Total T0U.S. B/A Total From U.S. B/A 
Ranking Commoditya (A) (B) (%) Commoditya (A) (B) (%) 
1 Road vehicles 4,525 3,452 76.3 
2 Apparel and clothing 8,693 3,236 37.2 
accessories 
3 Footwear 3,801 2,336 61.5 
4 Telecom. sound 6,210 2,234 36.0 
recording 
apparatus 
and apparatus 
data-processing 
machines 
5 Electrical machinery 6,416 2,176 33.9 
6 Office and automatic 2,574 1,310 50.9 
(continued) 
Electrical machinery 5,526 1,454 26.3 
Transport equipment, 1,691 1,017 60.2 
and apparatus 
excluding road 
vehicles 
Organic chemicals 3,162 816 25.8 
Cereal and cereal 1,151 790 68.6 
preparations 
Raw hides, skins, and 1,141 770 67.5 
Metalliferous ores 1,887 593 31.4 
furskins 
and metal scrap 
Table 7.3 (continued) 
Exports Imports 
Value Value 
Total T0U.S. BIA Total From U.S. BIA 
Ranking Commodity' (A) (B) (%) Commodity' (A) (B) (%) 
I Miscellaneous 3,959 1,701 43.0 Machinery for 2,593 556 21.5 
manufactured particular industries 
articles 
metals their waste 
fabrics, made-up 
articles 
8 Manufactures of 1,973 783 39.7 Textile fibers and 1,484 524 35.3 
9 Textile yam, 4,847 624 12.9 Pulp and waste paper 838 522 62.2 
10 Iron and steel 3,186 577 18.1 General industrial 2,602 485 18.6 
machinery and 
equipment 
Subtotal 46,184 18,429 39.9 22,075 7,527 34.1 
Total exportsIimports 60,696 21,404 35.3 51,811 12,751 24.6 
Source: Korea Foreign Trade Association 
'Commodity classification is based on the Standard Korea Trade Classification at the two-digit level. 
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7.2 Protectionist Elements in U.S. Trade Policy: A Developing 
Country’s Perspective 
During the postwar period, the United States emphasized international co- 
operation to strengthen the multilateral trading system based on the GAR’S 
framework. However, beginning in the 1970s, and especially during the 
1980s, the United States has increasingly pursued an aggressive bilateral ap- 
proach to protect certain domestic interests and to increase its access to for- 
eign markets. Both the growing trade deficits of recent years and a heightened 
sensitivity to so-called unfair foreign trade practices are often cited as major 
factors behind such a policy shift in the United States. 
According to a recent IMF (1988) report, over the period 1980-87, the 
United States initiated a total of 411 antidumping (AD) investigations, 283 
countervailing duty (CVD) investigations, 60 safeguard investigations, and 60 
investigations of “unfair” trade practices abroad under Section 301 of the U.S. 
Trade Act of 1974. Of these, about 40 percent were directed at exports from 
developing countries, whereas their share in total U.S. imports represented 
only 26 percent. The recent trend contrasts with the total of 196 AD and 125 
CVD investigations and 20 Section 301 investigations conducted by the 
United States during the postwar period until 1980. Furthermore, as of May 
1988, the United States maintains 62 voluntary export restraints (VERs) out 
of a total of 261 known to exist worldwide. These affect mainly textile and 
steel products that are major export items of developing countries, especially 
NIEs. 
There is considerable evidence indicating that such actions based on U.S. 
trade laws have been used more as a form of “administered protection” or 
“process protectionism” rather than to counter “unfair” foreign trade practices 
(see, e.g., Finger, Hall, and Nelson 1982; and Schott 1989). A number of 
VERs that protect the domestic market are, for instance, the result of AD or 
CVD investigations or safeguard actions.’ 
Since the 1979 trade legislation, the scope of U.S. trade laws has been 
steadily broadened to cover almost any foreign trade and industrial policy as 
a potential candidate for retaliation, and the criteria and requirements for 
granting import relief in particular situations have been significantly eased. 
The recently passed Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 is one 
such example. According to the law, the scope for which AD or CVD actions 
could be applied was significantly extended and the criteria relaxed. Further, 
the U.S. administration was given enough discretionary power to eliminate 
any foreign trade practices that are deemed to be “unfair” according to the 
criteria set by U.S. government officials. Threats to restrict access to its do- 
mestic market have been used as a major bargaining chip by the United States. 
1. It is striking to learn that such administered protection is cited as one of the serious reasons 
why Canada recently entered into a free trade agreement with the United States (see IMF 1988, 
121. 
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The increased use of a bilateral approach to settle trade disputes by the 
United States appears to have worked adversely, especially against developing 
countries, whose bargaining leverage is relatively weak. For instance, once a 
charge is successfully filed, the burden of proof falls entirely on exporters. 
Such proof, however, requires not only a large amount of information but also 
expensive legal costs, which may be too burdensome for many developing 
countries to bear.2 Hence merely filing a petition itself can be a powerful 
means of harassing developing country exporters. 
In the following section, a brief review will be made of major U.S. trade 
laws and practices, examining protectionist elements inherently embedded in 
those laws and practices, mainly from the perspective of developing coun- 
tries. 
7.2.1 Safeguard Actions (Section 201) 
The objective of Section 201 of the Trade Act of 1974, as amended, is to 
provide an industry temporary relief from import competition for structural 
adjustment. Hence, it is not necessarily related to any potentially “unfair” 
foreign trade practices. Its principles are embodied in Article XIX of the 
GATT, the escape clause that, under the appropriate circumstances, permits 
contracting parties to escape temporarily from GATT commitments and take 
measures to protect an injured domestic industry. 
Under Section 201, the U.S. International Trade Commission (ITC) is re- 
quired to report its findings on injuries to the president; if the finding is affir- 
mative, the ITC’s report includes a remedy recommendation that the president 
may consider to alleviate the injury. Relief may be provided through any com- 
bination of tariffs and quotas, trade adjustment assistance to the injured do- 
mestic industry, or negotiated orderly market agreements (OMAs) with rele- 
vant foreign nations. Relief may last for a maximum of eight years.3 
Import relief under Section 201 is supposed to be applied to all imports 
rather than those from a selected number of countries or firms; hence, it is 
nondiscriminatory. Furthermore, Article XIX of the GATT authorizes mem- 
ber countries to retaliate if the country undertaking safeguard actions does not 
compensate its trading partners for the increased protection provided for its 
domestic industry. 
When properly enforced, therefore, Section 201 seems to provide an appro- 
2. For example, in June 1988, a Korean firm producing industrial belts was petitioned by U.S. 
firms on AD and CVD charges, but the CVD charge was dropped in April 1989 for de minimus 
benefits, and the AD charge was closed with no injury finding in June 1989. In the meantime, 
however, it cost the firm nearly $300,000 in legal expenses (for U.S. lawyers) alone to defend 
itself against the invalid charges. The firm’s exports to the U.S. market were $4.3 million in 1988. 
An UNCTAD (1984, 16) study also reports that the cost of a fairly routine AD or CVD proceeding 
in the United States easily exceeds $100,000. 
3 .  Prior to the 1988 Trade Act, the maximum period was five years, with a possible extension 
of three more years. 
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priate route for temporary protection while causing less friction to its trading 
partners, especially developing countries. Unfortunately, however, this route 
has been used infrequently, compared to other means of administered protec- 
tion, for several reasons. First, the standard used in determining injury under 
Section 201 is in general higher than that used for AD or CVD cases since 
Section 201 investigations include imports from all sources that are not alleg- 
edly unfair trade (see Stern and Wechsler 1986). Second, even if injury to a 
domestic industry has been found, the president is not legally bound to follow 
the ITC’s recommendation to remedy the situation. Finally, the president may 
be, in fact, reluctant to authorize protection measures because that could pro- 
voke retaliation unless compensation is adequate. In an effort to avoid such 
retaliation, the president frequently resorts to negotiated settlements through 
VERs or OMAs with certain key suppliers that limit their exports to the 
United States. 
7 . 2 . 2  Antidumping and Countervailing Duties 
United States antidumping laws4 are designed to raise the price of foreign 
goods sold in the United States at “less than fair value” (LTFV) or “dumped.” 
The U.S. countervailing duty law5 aims to offset the price advantage of im- 
ported goods due to subsidies provided by foreign governments. According to 
these statutes, import relief is to be automatically granted on the finding of 
material injury, or threat of material injury, inflicted on the domestic industry 
by foreign imports and the finding that the imports causing the injury are 
either sold at LTFV or subsidized. 
These unfair trade laws are consistent with GATT rules as they appear in 
Articles VI and XVI. GATT rules require, for instance, that the importing 
country’s industry has been injured and that that injury was caused by either 
LTFV or government subsidies, but under the GATT each importing country 
sets up its own specific criteria for such findings. For the past decade, these 
criteria have been constantly revised to make it easier to raise protectionist 
barriers using the U.S. AD and CVD laws. There is considerable evidence to 
indicate that these unfair trade laws have been abused in the United States as 
anticompetitive or antitrade instruments, reducing the general welfare of both 
exporting and importing countries. The abuse is made possible, especially 
against developing countries, partly because the laws fail to reflect modem 
economics and partly because there is a lot of leeway for government officials 
to interpret and enforce the laws. Some of the notable features will be dis- 
cussed briefly below. 
First, under the current U.S. AD laws or GATT rules, any price discrimi- 
nation between the home market and abroad due to exporting at a price lower 
4. Tariff Act of 1930, Sec. 73 1, as amended. 
5 .  Tariff Act of 1930, Sec. 701, as amended. 
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than that charged on the home market, regardless of the cost of production, 
may be subject to AD charges. In many developing countries, however, do- 
mestic prices may be set higher than their export prices, for a variety of rea- 
sons.6 For instance, in developing countries where imports are protected and 
the domestic market size is not large enough to warrant perfect competition, a 
domestic monopoly or oligopoly may sell its products on the domestic market 
at prices higher than internationally competitive levels. In these circum- 
stances, foreign competitors are not harmed because their export prices are 
normally set at least at or above international levels. In fact, sales in domestic 
markets are favored more than sales abroad in such cases. Nonetheless, such 
a price difference is normally subject to an AD charge. It is believed that such 
price discrimination is most common in developing countries, especially 
where a policy shift from inward to outward orientation has yet to be made. 
Even in outward-oriented developing countries, it is not uncommon to 
maintain relatively high import barriers. This is because the extent of liberal- 
ization of their import regime is often dictated by policy options open to them 
at the time they shift from inward to outward orientation. For example, econ- 
omies like Korea or Taiwan, which are unlike Hong Kong or Singapore, pur- 
sued their outward orientation without wholesale dismantling of their import 
barriers, at least until very recently. In these economies, outward orientation 
was achieved through the use of export subsidies to offset the antiexport bias 
of their import barriers (an “export-subsidy’’ route to outward orientation), 
instead of an outright liberalization of trade with currency adjustments (a “free 
trade” route to outward orientation) .’ 
The export-subsidy route is a close substitute for the free trade route, at 
least in theory, since a 10 percent tariff on all imports, together with a 10 
percent subsidy on all exports, would be equivalent to no tariff and no subsidy 
and a 10 percent depreciated exchange rate. Unless the export-subsidy route 
leads to a balance-of-payments surplus, therefore, foreign competitors should 
not consider it harmful compared to a free trade situation. In fact, developing 
economies like Brazil, Mexico, and Korea have, until recently, all been expe- 
riencing balance-of-payments deficits despite subsidies provided for their ex- 
ports, indicating that their subsidies were not enough to offset their currency 
overvaluation. Nonetheless, their import protection policies have frequently 
led to AD charges, and, at the same time, their export subsidies have been 
frequently countervailed by the United States. 
6. Providing import protection for an export industry may sound ironic, but it is often done as 
part of an overall incentive system or under infant-export arguments. Or exports may be differen- 
tiated products, which may differ slightly from products for domestic sales. 
7. The export-subsidy route has often been preferred to the free trade route, mostly for political 
reasons: because of the political influence of vested interest groups benefiting from import protec- 
tion, because of the fear of the inflationary effect of a required devaluation, and because of the 
erroneous belief on the part of policymakers that exports and import substitution could be better 
promoted under the export-subsidy route. 
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Second, the GATT fails to provide a general definition of the export or 
domestic subsidies to be banned. It does take, however, a somewhat more 
lenient view of domestic subsidies while strictly banning any form of export 
subsidies, providing a positive list of objectives for which domestic subsidies 
may be used.s However, U.S. CVD law forbids any domestic subsidies as 
long as they are industry specific, irrespective of their  objective^.^ Therefore, 
even domestic subsidies aimed at compensating externalities or offsetting 
other domestic distortions are banned under current U.S. CVD law. This 
amounts to depriving developing countries of some of the more efficient 
means of supporting their industrialization efforts. 
Third, both the GATT and the U.S. AD (or CVD) laws require an injury 
test as a prerequisite for imposing AD duties (or CVDs) on dumped (or sub- 
sidized) imports, yet the meaning of material injury is not clearly defined.1° 
The concept of material injury is increasingly problematic, particularly for 
developing countries. Aside from the unclear definition of material injury, the 
loose requirement of a causal link between dumping (or subsidies) and injury 
in the GATT rules as well as in U.S. law’’ can lead to the abuse of AD (or 
CVD) measures by blurring the distinction between subsidies and shifts in 
comparative advantage as a major cause of the material injury. In fact, this 
view is partly supported by the evidence that recent U.S. countervailing ac- 
tions have been heavily concentrated in a few industries, such as iron and 
steel, textiles, and metal products, in which comparative advantage has 
already been established in favor of developing countries (see, e.g., Nam 
1987, 739). 
Finally, when the ITC’s preliminary determination of injury is positive, the 
Department of Commerce (DOC) calculates dumping margins by comparing 
the adjusted “U.S. price” of the imported product to its “fair value” or “for- 
eign market value.” The fair value is normally estimated on the basis of the 
home market price of exporting nations. But the DOC can determine the fair 
value on the basis of the export price to third countries when the sales volume 
in the home market is small. The DOC can also use a “constructed value” for 
the fair value when neither the home market price nor the export price to third 
countries is deemed adequate for the fair value. The “constructed value” ap- 
pears to be the most abused concept in calculating dumping margins, how- 
ever. It is based on the estimated cost of production using the best information 
available, often information provided by petitioners. The constructed value 
also includes general expenses of at least 10 percent of the estimated produc- 
8. For detailed GAlT rules on subsidies, see Nam (1987). 
9. See Sec. 771[5][B] of the U.S. Trade Agreement Act of 1979. 
10. According to the U.S. Trade Agreement Act of 1979, material injury is defined as “harm 
which is not inconsequential, immaterial or unimportant” (Sec. 77 1[7][A]). 
1 1. When the ITC determines the existence of injury, that determination is based on the cumu- 
lative effect on the U.S. industry of imports from all sources in the aggregate, rather than the 
imports from the country in question. 
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tion costs, plus a profit of at least 8 percent of the sum of such general ex- 
penses and the production cost, and the cost of packing for shipment to the 
United States. The value, so constructed, may be sufficiently elastic to meet 
any protectionist purpose of government officials. 
7.2.3 
Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended, is designed to provide 
relief to firms suffering from the infringement of intellectual property rights 
by foreign competitors and from unfair methods of competition or unfair acts 
in the importation of merchandise into the United States. The violations of 
intellectual property rights include import practices that infringe on valid and 
enforceable U.S. patents, copyrights, or trademarks. Other unfair import 
practices include methods or acts (such as antitrust violations, false designa- 
tion of origin, or improper interference with contractual obligations) that de- 
stroy, threaten, or substantially injure a U.S. industry or prevent its establish- 
ment. 
Section 337 is administered by the ITC. The ITC investigates any alleged 
violation of the law under Section 337 and reports its findings to the president, 
along with a statement of the action to be taken as a result of the investigation. 
The president can reject the ITC’s findings, but such presidential action is 
rare. 
The penalties in Section 337 cases can be very severe. A violation can result 
in a general exclusion of the concerned product, and all other goods contain- 
ing it as an intermediate input, from the U.S. market. In addition, or alterna- 
tively, the ITC may issue a cease-and-desist order to the exporters committing 
the unfair act or practice. The 1988 Trade Act has significantly reinforced the 
penalty scheme for the enforcement of Section 337. At the same time, the 
1988 Trade Act amended Section 337 so that U.S. petitioners need not prove 
injury to win an affirmative ITC determination in cases involving infringe- 
ment of U.S. intellectual property rights. No doubt, these amendments signif- 
icantly increase the chance that this law will be abused. The abuse is more 
likely against exports from NIEs like Korea since the structure of their exports 
is rapidly shifting into technologically more sophisticated products. 
Recently, at the request of the EC, a GATT panel was formed to investigate 
Section 337. The panel reported in January 1989 that Section 337 violated the 
GATT rule (Article 111, 4) of national treatment for imports. The panel found 
that Section 337 treated imported goods charged with patent infringement less 
favorably than domestic goods would be treated under U.S. domestic law. The 
United States, however, has not yet indicated whether it will revise its laws to 
accommodate the panel’s recommendation. 
7.2.4 The National Security Clause (Section 232) 
Recently, U.S. firms or industries have even tried to have the U.S. govern- 
ment invoke trade restrictions against imports from Japan and other countries 
Unfair Import Practices (Section 337) 
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for reasons of national security. According to Section 232 of the Trade Expan- 
sion Act of 1962, as amended, the U.S. president is allowed to “adjust” im- 
ports so that they will not be a threat to or impair national security. Of course, 
this law is backed up by the GATT in principle.’* 
In the past, many U.S. industries have sought relief from import competi- 
tion under the national security clause, but the U.S. government has been very 
cautious in granting it. The danger of misuse of the national security argument 
is quite obvious because it could readily be applied to all kinds of economic 
activities. Also, such misuse could readily call for the escalation of retalia- 
tion. For that reason, perhaps, only one industry, the powerful oil industry- 
and no manufacturing industry-has been successful so far in getting import 
relief under Section 232 (see Saxonhouse 1986, 234). The abuse of this law is 
not, however, unthinkable in the future. 
7.2.5 Section 301 
Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, as amended in 1988, is designed to 
enforce U.S. rights under international agreements and to effectively counter 
foreign unfair trade practices. Unfair trade practices include any act, policy, 
or practice of a foreign government that is found to violate an international 
trade agreement or anything that is construed to be “unjustifiable, unreason- 
able, or discriminatory.” l 3  Section 30 1 requires the U.S. trade representative 
(USTR) to take all appropriate and feasible actions to eliminate such unfair 
foreign trade practices. 
Section 301 was considerably strengthened by requiring tougher reciprocity 
in market access as amended in the 1988 Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness 
Act. The meaning of unreasonable practices was further elaborated to in- 
clude, for example, the failure of effective protection of intellectual property 
rights, the denial of fair and equitable market opportunities, toleration of pri- 
vate anticompetitive schemes, export targeting, and the persistent denial of 
workers’ rights. The 1988 Trade Act made retaliatory action mandatory in 
cases involving “unjustifiable” acts14 and at the USTR’s discretion in cases 
involving “unreasonable or discriminatory” practices. 
The 1988 Trade Act also amended Section 301 by adding a provision that 
is known as “Super-301 .” This provision requires the USTR to identify “prior- 
12. Article XXI of the GAIT states, e.g., that “nothing in this agreement shall be construed 
, . . (b) to prevent any contracting party from taking any action which it considers necessary for 
the protection of its essential security interests.” 
13. Unjustifiable practices are those that are inconsistent with international legal rights; un- 
reasonable practices are unfair or inequitable practices, although they may not be inconsistent 
with international legal rights; and discriminatory practices are the denial of most-favored-nation 
(MFN) treatment to U.S. goods, services, or investments (see Sec. 301[d]). 
14. Mandatory retaliation has certain exceptions, however. For instance, the USTR need not 
retaliate when the United States receives an unfavorable determination or ruling by the GATT, 
when a foreign country is taking specific measures to eliminate the problem, or when U.S. action 
is likely to affect the U.S. economy adversely. 
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ity foreign unfair practices” and “priority foreign countries” and to conduct 
bilateral negotiations with designated countries over a three-year period to 
reduce, eliminate, or compensate for these practices, or to retaliate. The 
Super-301 provision was only a temporary measure, however, lasting two 
years and expiring in 1990. 
During the 1980s, and especially since the mid-l980s, the United States 
accelerated the use of Section 301 at an unprecedented rate, often directing it 
against developing economies. The aggressive use of Section 301 is particu- 
larly worrisome for developing countries, for several reasons. 
First, Section 301 is neither covered by the GATT nor consistent with the 
GATT’s principle of nondiscrimination. This law can be used highly selec- 
tively in choosing target countries or target practices, and there are no certain 
rules for retaliation. Therefore, the uncertainties that traders face under the 
threat of 301 actions can be unbearably high, particularly for developing 
countries whose trade dependency on the U.S. market is relatively high. 
Second, any retaliation or threats of retaliation can quickly generate ampli- 
fied political responses from trading partners. In particular, developing coun- 
tries may feel that any unilateral liberalization effort needs to be reserved for 
future trade negotiations with the United States. 
Finally, to enforce Section 301 properly, the United States has to constantly 
play the role of an international police force against all economic policies in 
all countries, which would require an exorbitant amount of resources. Re- 
sources certainly could be used more efficiently. 
7.2.6 Voluntary Export Restraints 
Beginning in the late 1970s, VERs became a popular means of import 
restriction in the United States. VERs are often negotiated when other GATT- 
consistent trade remedies are found to be ineffective or have difficulties con- 
trolling the flow of imports. Since VERs pretend to be voluntary and are bilat- 
eral in nature, they escape both U.S. laws and the GATT. While VERs give 
U.S. trade negotiators greater flexibility in providing protection for domestic 
producers, they reduce the pressure for domestic industries to adjust to chang- 
ing conditions. 
Since VERs allow foreigners to administer the export controls, they implic- 
itly compensate the exporting country by transferring quota rents to the ex- 
porters at the cost of domestic consumers. Furthermore, VERs tend to provide 
more stable and certain trade environments, with secure market-sharing ar- 
rangements, than would alternative trade measures. Mostly for these reasons, 
exporting countries often easily yield to pressure to accept a VER. 
However, there are reasons to worry about the rising trend of VERs. First, 
once a VER is instituted, it is not easy to get out of the trap since both export- 
ers and importers have shared interests in maintaining it. Further, there is a 
great temptation to expand it to a global scale, thus contributing to the erosion 
of an open world trading system. As a result, the smooth industrial transfor- 
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mation to a changing comparative advantage would be significantly disturbed 
or delayed in both countries. The life of sunset industries may be prolonged, 
but the sunrise industries may stop growing long before they reach a peak. 
The damage will certainly be greater for countries with the potential for more 
rapid growth. 
7.3 The Pattern of U.S.-Administered Protection as Applied to 
Korean Exports 
7.3.1 Recent Trends 
Korean exports have been facing increasingly adverse market situations in 
industrial countries, particularly since the mid- 1970s. Of Korean exports 
going to nineteen industrial countries, the share of exports under import re- 
strictions rose from 27.8 percent in 1976 to a peak of 45.8 percent in 1981, as 
shown in table 7.4. According to the table, however, the share has declined 
since then, to 22.3 percent by 1989. 
A similar pattern holds for Korean exports to the United States: the share of 
Korean exports under restrictions rose from 37.5 percent in 1976 to a peak of 
43.3 percent in 1985 but declined to 19.7 percent in 1989. The recent decline 
in the export coverage of NTBs, however, may be attributed more to the rapid 
growth of Korean exports than to the increased liberalization of import restric- 
Table 7.4 Korean Exports under NTBs by Major Il-ading Partners 
~ ~~ 
1976 1981 1985 1987 1989 
Exports to the U.S.: 
Total exports (million 
U.S. dollars) 2,493 5,661 10,754 18,311 20,639 
Exports under NTBs 
(million U.S. dol- 
lars) 935 2,412 4,656 4,855 4,072 
Share (=  BIA) (%) 37.5 42.6 43.3 26.5 19.7 
Canada 39.3 45.6 31.1 42.9 23.9 
EC 31.6 39.3 29.5 41 .O 22.3 
Japan 14.5 48.5 32.0 19.4 23.7 
19 industrial countriesa 27.8 45.8 36.6 31.0 22.3b 
Share (%) of exports under NTBs to other industrial countries: 
Source: Korea Foreign Trade Association, Overview on Import Restrictions of Major Industrial- 
ized Countries (various issues). 
Note: NTBs here include VERs, ADS, CVDs, safeguard actions, and other import restriction 
under administrative or unfair trade regulations in force or under investigation. 
"he nineteen industrial countries are the United States, Canada, Japan, Australia, New Zealand, 
Germany, the United Kingdom, France, the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, Denmark, 
Italy, Greece, Ireland, Finland, Norway, Sweden, and Austria. 
bOf the nineteen industrial countries, New Zealand is omitted. 
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tions on the part of the United States: Korea’s overall exports to the United 
States increased more than threefold, from $5.7 to $20.6 billion for the period 
1981-89, while its exports to the United States under import restrictions in- 
creased about twofold, from $2.4 to $4.1 billion for the same period. The 
recent decline of Korean exports to the United States under NTBs, particu- 
larly during the later half of the 198Os, could also have been induced partly by 
a U.S. policy shift from raising protection of domestic industries to increasing 
access to foreign markets.15 Nevertheless, 20 percent of Korean exports to the 
United States were still taking place under various forms of administered pro- 
tection as of 1989. 
Table 7.5 presents estimates of Korean exports going to the U.S. market 
under various types of administered protection. Over the period 1984-89, 
Korea exported a total of $27.1 billion to the U.S. market under various mea- 
sures of administered protection. Of this total, nearly 77 percent was covered 
by VERs, 11.5 percent by ADS or CVDs, 4.5 percent by safeguard actions, 
and the remaining 6.7 percent by other unfair trade laws like Section 337 or 
the National Security Clause of Section 232. 
VERs, therefore, appear to be the most important import-restricting instru- 
ment in force against Korean exports to the United States as far as their export 
coverage is concerned. Two of them were particularly notable during the later 
half of the 1980s. One is the VER on textile and clothing products under the 
Multifiber Arrangement (MFA) quotas, and the other is a VER agreement on 
iron and steel products. 
International trade in textiles and clothing has long been regulated by re- 
strictive trading systems. At first, the Short Term Cotton Textile Arrangement 
(STA) came into effect in 1961, and this was followed by a more comprehen- 
sive agreement known as the Long Term Arrangement on Cotton Textiles 
(LTA) in 1962. The LTA evolved into the first Multifiber Arrangement (MFA 
I) in 1974, in which coverage was expanded to noncotton products, especially 
synthetic fiber products. Since then, there have been several renewals: cur- 
rently, MFA IV (1986-91) is in effect. 
The main objective proclaimed in these agreements were to foster the ex- 
pansion of world trade in textiles with the reduction of barriers to such trade 
while, at the same time, preventing disruptive effects in individual markets. 
But, each time the MFA was renewed, it was accompanied by an increase in 
coverage as well as in intensity to regulate international trade in textile prod- 
ucts. According to a recent study by Kim (1989), for example, the number of 
15. In recent years, e.g., the United States has launched a number of Section 301 investigations 
mainly to increase its access to Korean markets, beginning with cases for the liberalization of the 
insurance market and the protection of U.S. intellectual property rights in Korea in 1985. U.S. 
interests moved to cases of import liberalization of cigarettes, beef, and wine in 1988 and more 
recently to such areas as the opening up of the domestic telecommunications industry and remov- 
ing restrictions on direct foreign investments. So far, most of these cases have been concluded to 
the satisfaction of the United States, and no Section 301 threat has yet been transformed into 
retaliatory action. 
Table 7.5 Korean Exports Going to the United States under Restrictions, by 'Qpe of Administrative 
Protection, 1984-89 (million U.S. dollars) 
VER Total 
Section 337 & Exports under Exports to Share 
Textile Steel ADsa CVDs Safeguard Section 232b Restrictions' U.S. ([6]/[7]) 
Year (la) ( lb) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
1984 2,166 
1985 2,191 
1986 2,510 
1987 2,944 
1988 3,065 
1989 3,135 
(46.5) 
(47.1) 
(54.3) 
(60.6) 
(72.3) 
(77.0) 
975 1,106 
(20.9) (23.7) 
869 412 
(18.7) (8.8) 
73 1 397 
(15.8) (8.6) 
735 354 
(15.1) (7.3) 
846 310 
652 270 
(16.0) (6.6) 
(20.0) (7.3) 
35 
(.8) 
15 
(.3) 
965 
(20.9) 
799 
(16.5) 
4 
( .I)  
4 
( . I )  
4,662 10,479 44.5 
4,656 10,754 43.3 
4,621 13,880 33.3 
4,855 18,311 26.5 
4,239 2 1,404 19.8 
4,072 20,639 19.7 
(100) 
(100) 
(loo) 
(loo) 
(100) 
(100) 
Total 16,011 4,787 2,849 270 1,215 1,822 27,105 95,467 28.4 
(59.1) (17.7) (10.5) (1.0) (4.5) (6.7) (100) 
Source: See table 7.4. 
Note: Numbers given in parentheses represent the share of exports under respective restriction in total exports under all restrictions. 
aExports that were subject to ADS and CVDs at the same time were included in AD cases. 
bSection 337 refers to unfair importing practices, and Section 232 refers to National Security Clause. 
'Exports under restriction = (1) + (2) + (3) + (4) + (5), including exports under investigation. 
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product categories of Korean exports in textile and clothing products going to 
the U.S. market under restrictions increased from twenty-seven during the 
MFA I1 period (1978-81) to seventy-five during the MFA IV period (1987- 
91), out of a maximum of 11 1 categories. When the MFA restriction ratio was 
measured by the share of MFA-restricted exports to total exports of textile and 
clothing products going to the U.S. market, it showed an increase from 73 to 
97.3 percent between the two periods. It is, therefore, evident that most of the 
Korean exports of textile and clothing products going to the U.S.  market are 
now subject to MFA quotas. Amazingly enough, however, Korea was able to 
increase its exports of textile and clothing products to the United States from 
$1.1 to nearly $4 billion for the period 1981-88, largely through product di- 
versification and quality upgrading, whereas total Korean exports of textiles 
and clothing to all markets increased from $5.5 to $14.1 billion for the same 
period. 
VERs on iron and steel products have a long history as well. The first one 
came into effect in 1968 when the United States negotiated VERs with Japa- 
nese and European exporters of steel to the United States. These were phased 
out with the worldwide steel boom in 1973. But, as steel market conditions 
continued to deteriorate in the late 1970s, the U.S. government introduced the 
trigger-price system (TPS) in 1978. Under the TPS, any imports priced below 
the trigger price were to be automatically retaliated against by AD duties, 
where the trigger prices were determined by Japanese unit costs of production 
plus freight from Japan to the United States. 
As import penetration continued in the early 1980s, despite the TPS, U.S. 
steel producers began to file AD or CVD suits, and the U.S.  government had 
to suspend the TPS in 1982. These unfair-trade-law suits, however, were not 
enough to control imports. The import penetration ratio reached over 20 per- 
cent of apparent domestic consumption in 1983 and over 25 percent in 1984. 
In early 1984, Bethlehem Steel and the United Steel Workers filed a petition 
under Section 201 to limit the share of imports to less than 15 percent of the 
U.S.  market, and the ITC recommended quotas to keep the import share less 
than 18.5 percent of the domestic market. The U.S. government, however, 
opted for the VER approach in place of imposing worldwide quotas under 
section 201 to limit steel imports. The stated purpose of the VER was to con- 
trol “unfairly traded” steel. But bilateral negotiations on VERs were con- 
cluded with major steel suppliers, including countries that trade fairly. For this 
VER program, Congress passed the Steel Import Stabilization Act, which en- 
abled the president to enforce the steel VER for a five-year period ending on 
30 September 1989. Under this VER program, Korea reached an agreement 
with the United States to limit its steel exports to less than 1.9 percent of U.S. 
domestic consumption on average. Recently, the steel VER was extended for 
another two and a half years. 
Since the steel VER came into effect in late 1984, Korean exports of steel 
products have showed a declining trend in value despite the price-raising effect 
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of VERs, indicating that Korean steel exports declined more rapidly in vol- 
ume in recent years (see table 7.5: further discussion follows in sec. 7.4 
below). 
Excluding VERs, table 7.6 presents data on the frequency of various types 
of administered protection initiated by the United States against Korean ex- 
ports or industries for the period 1980-89. According to the table, the number 
of initiations began to surge especially after 1982, when Korea began to re- 
cord a trade surplus vis-a-vis the United States while the overall trade deficit 
of the United States began to grow at an unprecedented rate. The frequency 
reached a peak of eleven initiations in 1985 and since then has declined to six 
initiations in 1988. 
Of the various types of administered protection, ADS have been most fre- 
quently employed, with a total of twenty-five cases for the period 1980-89. 
CVD cases and safeguard actions have been relatively infrequent, with a total 
of eight and eleven cases, respectively, for the same period. It is interesting to 
observe that initiations under Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930 have risen 
significantly, especially in the later half of the 1980s, with a total of sixteen 
cases for the period 1980-89. During the same period, three cases were initi- 
ated under Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962. This contrasts 
with the number of administered protection cases that were registered during 
the 1970s. There were only six AD charges, four Section 337 cases, and no 
Section 232 cases during the 1970s. Administered protection, however, more 
Table 7.6 Frequency of US.- Administered Protection Initiated against Korean 
Exports, 1980-89 
Section Section 
ADS CVDs 337 232 Total 
Safeguard 
~ _ _ _  ~ _ _ _ ~  
Year h i .  Aff. h i .  Aff. h i .  Aff. h i .  Aff. h i .  Aff. h i .  Aff. 
1970s 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
Total, 
198%89 
6 2 9 4 1 0 6 4 2  29 14 
1 1  I 1  
1 1  1 1  2 2  
2 . . .  1 1 3 1  
5 3  1 . . .  3 2 1 . . .  10 5 
3 . . .  2 1 3 . . .  8 1  
5 3 3 1 3 . . .  11 4 
4 3 1 1  4 3  9 7  
1 . . .  5 3 1 . . .  7 3 
2 1  1 . . . 1 . . . 1 . . . 1 . . . 6  1 
3 2  3 2  6 4  
25 13 8 4 11 2 16 10 3 . . . 63 29 
Source: See table 7.4. 
Note: h i .  = number of cases initiated. Aff. = affirmative determination, including alternative 
arrangements. Figures represent numbers of cases. 
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often took the form of CVD or safeguard actions during the 1970s, with nine 
and ten initiations, respectively. 
The probability that such charges could obtain import relief appears to have 
been small, however. On average, roughly 46 percent of those charges made 
during the period 1980-89 ended up with some form of import relief, but the 
probability varies highly depending on the type of charge made. For example, 
nearly 70 percent of the Section 337 cases were able to obtain import relief 
either by an exclusion order or by a negotiated settlement through arrange- 
ments. But no case under the National Security Clause of Section 232 was 
successful in obtaining import relief. Petitions under Section 201 also had 
difficulty in obtaining import relief. However, more than half the AD or CVD 
cases obtained import relief with affirmative final determination. 
LTFV charges, especially ADS, therefore, appear to have been the most 
important instrument of administered protection applied to Korean exports 
during the 1980s, and charges under Section 337 for the infringement of intel- 
lectual property rights showed a rapid rise during the later half of the 1980s. 
It is likely that charges under Section 337 will increasingly become a source 
of harassment in the future since U.S. producers no longer need to prove in- 
jury before the ITC to win the case. Some aspects of administered protection 
regarding the LTFV cases will be examined in more detail below in light of 
the Korean experience. 
7.3.2 LTFV Cases 
According to current LTFV case laws in the United States, the ITC is given 
the authority to determine the existence of injury on a case-by-case basis, and 
the DOC is in charge of determining the existence and the magnitude of 
dumping (or subsidization) brought by exporting firms (or governments). 
When the U.S. government receives a LTFV petition, the ITC is required to 
complete its preliminary investigation on injury within forty-five days, and 
the DOC is required to complete its preliminary determination on dumping 
(or subsidization) within 160 days (with a possible extension of fifty days). 
If the preliminary determination of injury is negative, the case ends there. 
But if it is positive, the investigation continues to final determination, irre- 
spective of the outcome of the DOC’s preliminary determination on dumping 
(or subsidization). If the DOC’s preliminary determination on dumping (or 
subsidization) is positive, however, “suspension of liquidation” of imports be- 
comes necessary, and the concerned importers must post a bond with the gov- 
ernment to pay ADS (or CVDs) if the final determination is also positive. Both 
the ITC and the DOC are required to complete final determination on injury 
and dumping (or subsidization), respectively, within seventy-five days of 
DOC’s preliminary determination on dumping (or subsidization). 
Table 7.7 provides information on the actual disposition of AD or CVD 
investigations conducted by the United States against Korean exports during 
the 1980s. Several features are worth noting. First, out of a total of thirty AD 
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Table 7.7 Disposition of AD and CVD Investigations by the United States against 
Korean Exports, 1980-88 
No. of Average AD Average Subsidy 
Investigations Margins Margins 
Preliminary disposition 
A. Affirmative dumping (or subsidy) 
B. Alternative arrangements negotiated 
C. Restrictive, total (A + B) 
determination 
D. Negative injury determination” 
E. Negative dumping (or subsidy) mar- 
gin determination,h including de 
minimus 
F. Case withdrawn or terminated 
G. Not restrictive, total (D + E + F) 
H.  Pending or under investigation 
Final disposition 
A. ADS or CVDs imposed 
B. Alternative arrangements negotiated 
C. Restrictive, total (A + B) 
D. Negative injury determination 
E. Negative dumping (or subsidy) mar- 
gin determination,d including de 
minimus 
F. Case withdrawn or terminated 
G. Not restrictive, total (D + E + F) 
H .  Pending or under investigation 
30 
(100) 
16 14.64 5.45 
(53) (2.27-64.37) (1.75-12.5) 
0 
(0) 
16 
(53) 
3 
(10) 
6 
(20) 
3 
(10) 
12 
2 
(7) 
30 
(100) 
(40) 
8 18.10 2.60 
(27) ( 1.91-64.8 1) (.78-4.42) 
5‘ 3.34 1.71 
(16) (1.26-5 .OO) (1.62- 1 .8) 
13 
(43) 
1 .53 
(3) 
4 
(13) 
Source: See table 7.4. 
Nore: The percentage of dispositions is shown in parentheses. 
alnvestigation ends. There is no preliminary subsidy (or dumping-margin) determination in such cases. 
bInvestigation continues without suspension of liquidation. 
‘Includes five agreements reached after an affirmative final decision. 
dIf the final subsidy (or dumping margin) is negative, there is no final injury determination. 
cIncludes one case withdrawn after an affirmative subsidy determination. 
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or CVD cases initiated during the period 1980-88, sixteen cases (53 percent) 
received a positive determination on dumping (or subsidization) in their pre- 
liminary investigations. But, in their final determination, only eight cases 
ended up with the imposition of ADS or CVDs, whereas alternative arrange- 
ments were reached in five cases to limit exports or raise export prices. It 
appears, therefore, that preliminary determinations have been slightly biased 
toward affirmative outcomes, as compared with final determinations. Second, 
more important is that in only three cases was the preliminary injury finding 
negative; investigations went on to final determination in 90 percent of the 
cases, even though only 53 percent of the cases were successful in obtaining 
a positive determination in the DOC’S preliminary investigation. This must 
have increased both the burden of concerned exporters’ legal expenses and the 
uncertainty faced by both exporters and importers. In the process, many fi- 
nancially squeezed exporters would have been pressured into negotiated 
settlements through “arrangements .” 
Finally, calculations show that average dumping margins for AD cases were 
much greater than average subsidy rates for CVD cases, roughly 10 percent 
versus 2 percent, indicating that ADS have been a more powerful instrument 
than CVDs to control Korean exports. Also, in some cases, wide variation in 
dumping margins was observed between preliminary and final determina- 
tions, notably in the notorious color television (1983 to the present) and album 
(1985 to the present) cases. For example, according to U.S. Federal Register 
reports for the color television case, in 1983 the dumping margin was calcu- 
lated at 2.9 percent in the preliminary determination but 15.8 percent in the 
final determination. In an expedited review for the same case in 1984, how- 
ever, the dumping margin was calculated at 32.4 percent in the preliminary 
determination but at only 1 1.5 percent in the final determination. In the album 
case, in 1985 the dumping margin was calculated at 4.0 percent in the prelim- 
inary determination but jumped to 64.8 percent in the final determination. The 
final dumping margin was based on the so-called constructed value. The same 
64.8 percent dumping margin continued to survive even in the administrative 
review conducted in 1989 because the DOC still relied on the “best” informa- 
tion available to calculate the “constructed value.” In fact, Korean album ex- 
porters have long since given up their struggle to export to the U.S. market in 
the face of harassment by AD charges.I6 
7.3.3 Industry Incidence of U.S.-Administered Protection 
Table 7.8 presents frequency data on the industry incidence of administered 
protection initiated against Korean exports during the period 1980-89. Ac- 
cording to the table, the metal products industry has been most frequently 
affected by administered protection, with a total of sixteen initiations during 
16. Korean exports of album products to the U.S. market amounted to over U.S. $36 million in 
1984. Since 1986, however, that figure has never reached more than U.S. $0.33 million per year. 
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Table 7.8 Industry Incidence of US.-Administered Protection on Korean Exports, 
1980-89 
Unfair Trade National 
Practice Security Clause 
Industry ADS CVDs Safeguard (Sec. 337) (Sec. 232) Total 
Agricultural and marine 
Textiles 
products 
Footwear 
Iron and steel 
Metal products 
Machinery 
Electrical and electronic 
products 
Transport equipment 
Chemicals 
Miscellaneous 
Total 
Source: The same as in table 7.4. 
Note: Figures represent number of cases. Number of affirmative determinations including alternative 
arrangements is shown in parentheses. 
the period 1980-89, but the chance to obtain import relief was only 30 per- 
cent. The iron and steel industry has also frequently suffered from adminis- 
tered protection with a total of ten initiations for the same period. The success 
rate for obtaining import relief, however, was very high for the iron and steel 
industry, with an 80 percent chance. The major instruments of administered 
protection applied to these two industries include AD and CVD charges, with 
nine and eight cases, respectively, during the period 1980-89. 
Various forms of administered protection that were initiated against the iron 
and steel industry in the early 1980s were eliminated in return for the steel 
VER that was agreed on in 1984. The 1984 steel VER agreement also stipu- 
lated that, if any Korean steel exports were to encounter new investigations 
under Section 201, Section 232, Section 301, or AD or CVD laws, Korea was 
entitled to terminate the VER agreement with respect to some or all of the 
products covered by the steel VER. This illustrates vividly how alternative 
forms of administered protection can be exchanged to ensure a desired level 
of protection of the U.S. steel industry. 
Exports of electrical and electronic products, which has emerged as Korea’s 
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number one export category in recent years, were also frequently met by AD 
charges or patent infringement charges, with four cases each for the period 
Unlike AD or CVD actions, safeguard actions were dispersed more widely 
across industries, but the probability of their obtaining import relief was very 
slim: less than 20 percent. Out of a total of eleven initiations made during the 
period 1980-89, only two cases-stainless steel products and canned mush- 
rooms-were able to obtain import relief. Neither import relief action lasted 
more than three years, however. 
Under the National Security Clause of Section 232, there were three inves- 
tigations during the period 1980-89, concerning machine tools, bearings, and 
certain plastic molding machines, but none led to any positive action for im- 
port relief. 
In recent years, more technologically sophisticated Korean export products 
have been increasingly charged by U.S. industries with patent infringement 
under Section 337 of the Trade Act of 1930. These include, for example, such 
products as computer memory chips, car phones, metallic balloons, 
microwave-oven timers, and plastic bags. Since the punishment for patent in- 
fringement can be as severe as banning entry of the concerned articles into the 
United States, most cases tend to be settled through negotiated arrangements. 
For instance, of a total of sixteen cases initiated under Section 337 during the 
period 1980-88, ten were resolved through negotiated arrangements such as 
royalty payments or price or export quantity undertakings, three were dis- 
missed or negatively determined, and two were put under an exclusion order 
by the ITC. Of the remaining two cases, one was unilaterally withdrawn by 
the petitioner, and the other remains under investigation. 
1980-89. 
7.4 Effects of US-Administered Protection on Korean Exports 
As seen in table 7.5 above, of the various forms of administered protection 
that have been applied against Korean exports by the United States, VERs 
have been the most important instrument so far as their coverage of Korean 
exports is concerned. Combined exports under the MFA quotas and the steel 
VER quotas, for example, constituted more than 70 percent of Korean exports 
that were going to the U.S. market under various forms of administered pro- 
tection during the period 1984-88. 
The economic effect of such VERs on Korean exporters or the Korean 
economy, however, has been analyzed infrequently. For one thing, VERs are 
a relatively less painful instrument of administered protection from the ex- 
porter’s point of view. For another, any sensible analysis of VERs on an ex- 
porting country needs to be based on a global, instead of a bilateral, trade 
model since the United States makes bilateral VER agreements with many 
different major exporters at the same time. Any numerical exercise with such 
a global model, however, requires many ad hoc assumptions on various elas- 
ticities and may therefore be subject to a relatively large margin of error. 
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Nonetheless, the recent study by Tarr (1987) may be suggestive of the pos- 
sible effects of such VERs on an exporting economy. Using a global trade 
model, Tarr estimated the welfare effects on Korea of the recent steel VERs 
imposed by the United States and the EC. According to Tarr’s estimates, Ko- 
rea is better off under the steel VERs than it would have been in the absence 
of them, with a net welfare gain of $32.4 million as a result of the steel VERs. 
The steel VERs were estimated to increase Korea’s export price of steel prod- 
ucts by $23.3 per ton on average and to reduce Korea’s export volume of steel 
products going to U.S. and EC markets by 312,000 metric tons. This would 
result in a quota-rent transfer of $41.9 million to Korean exporters at the ex- 
pense of U. S,  and EC consumers. This would also incur a loss of $9.8 million 
for Korean exporters in inframarginal rents on their sales to the rest of the 
world. 
Tarr’s estimates of the welfare effects of the steel VERs on Korea, however, 
require cautious interpretation. First, the estimated welfare gain for Korea is 
based on an extremely short-run and static model. The analysis, therefore, 
fails to consider any dynamic consequences of the steel VER such as the wel- 
fare loss due to its investment-deterring effect on the steel industry in a dy- 
namic economy like Korea’s with the lowest steel-making costs in the world. 
Partly because of delayed domestic investments in the steel industry, which 
was characterized by scale economies, Korea has not even been able to fill its 
VER quotas granted by the United States in recent years.’* As can be seen in 
table 7.9, the share of Korean steel exports in U.S. steel consumption peaked 
in 1984 with a 2.3 percent share but declined to a 1.4 percent share in 1987, 
well below the 1.9 percent limit set by the Korea-U.S. steel VER agreement 
of 1984. Second, while the quota rents due to the steel VER are transferred to 
Korean exporters, some of them are bound to be dissipated by various forms 
of rent-seeking activities. Further, the quota rents help inefficient firms sur- 
vive owing to reduced competitive pressures, while potentially more efficient 
firms are prevented from entering the industry.I9 
17. For a detailed analysis of the international competitiveness of the Korean steel industry, see 
Nam (1986). 
18. Another important reason why Korea has been unable to fill its export quotas in recent years 
can be found in the dramatic recovery of the U.S. steel industry in terms of its international 
competitiveness, making home or other export markets more profitable for Korean steel makers. 
According to a recent report from the International Business and Economic Research Corporation 
(1989), e.g., the U.S. steel industry has significantly reduced its production costs by eliminating 
obsolete capacity and modernizing its facility. Between 1983 and 1988, according to the report, 
the U.S. steel industry closed down 39 million tons of obsolete capacity (about 25 percent of its 
total capacity), resulting in an increase in its capacity utilization rate from 56.2 to 88.7 percent 
and in cost reductions of at least 35 percent per ton of steel production. As a result, the U.S. steel 
industry was able to turn its losses of $2.2 billion in 1983 into profits of $1 billion by 1987. 
19. In allocating VER quotas among exporters, the Korean Ministry of Trade and Industry sets 
up the basic rules and guidelines, and the Korea Iron and Steel Association oversees their actual 
implementation. According to the rules, VER quotas are divided into basic and open quotas, of 
which basic quotas are to be allocated to individual firms on the basis of their previous year’s 
export performance in the U.S.  market of VER-quota items, whereas open quotas are determined 
on the basis of their export performance in the U.S. market of nonquota items and in non-U.S. 
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Table 7.9 Korean Exports of Steel Products under the Steel VER (%) 
t - 3  t - 2  r - 1  t t f l  r + 2  t + 3  
Exports to the U.S. 
Volume 63.7 45.2 91.0 100.0 76.6 61.3 62.7 
Unit price 111.2 108.0 88.4 100.0 121.4 125.2 123.2 
Share in U.S.  consumption I .2 1.4 2.1 2.3 2.0 1.7 1.4 
Exports to third countries: 
Volume 198.2 128.3 99.5 100.0 102.8 105.3 109.6 
Unit price 44.8 84.2 93.6 100.0 96.9 93.5 102.1 
Volume 153.8 100.8 96.7 100.0 93.7 90.8 94.1 
Unit price 53.6 86.5 91.7 100.0 103.1 100.0 105.9 
Exports to all countries: 
Source: Adapted partly from Barks (1989, table 21, p. 54) and American Iron and Steel Institute, Annual 
Statistical Report (various years). 
Note: t = 1984, when the Korea-U.S. steel VER went into effect. 
Table 7.9 provides data on Korean steel exports going to the U.S. market 
as well as to third-country markets before and after the Korea-U.S. steel VER 
agreement of 1984. Korean exports of steel products going to the U.S. markct 
declined sharply-by nearly 40 percent in volume-within the next two years 
after the 1984 steel VER agreement was reached. The unit export price rose 
by 25 percent over the same period. But it is not clear how much of this price 
rise may be attributed to the U.S.  steel VER since the prices of Korean steel 
exports may be affected by such other factors as changes in the product com- 
position of Korean exports and other cyclical factors as well. But the unit 
price of Korean steel exports to third-country markets did show a decline of 
6.5 percent for the same period, due, perhaps, to the intensified competition 
in these markets.*O Overall, Korean steel export volume declined 6 percent for 
the ensuing three years after the 1984 steel VER went into effect, but Korean 
exports to third-country markets increased 10 percent, suggesting that there 
was a substantial shift from U.S.  to third-country markets for the disposition 
of Korean steel exports. 
The MFA restrictions on the trade of textiles and clothing have long been in 
force, but relatively little is known about their economic consequences on 
exporters. One may be tempted, however, to conjecture that effects would 
areas of all steel products. Until 1989, about 90 percent of total VER quotas took the form of basic 
quotas, while the remaining 10 percent were open quotas. However, as Korea’s quota-filling rate 
dropped to as low as 60 percent of the VER quotas granted by the United States in 1989, the 
Ministry of Trade and Industry readjusted the distribution of basic and open quotas by reducing 
basic quotas to 70 percent and raising open quotas to 30 percent of total VER quotas in 1990. In 
principle, quota trading among exporters is not allowed in Korea. 
20. It is puzzling that Korean steel exports to third countries were halved in volume while their 
export price doubled in the three years prior to 1984, as seen in table 9.10 below. They may reflect 
the severity of the worldwide recession in the steel market in the early 1980s with actual existence 
of dumping in third-country markets, while the U.S. market was sheltered under the TPS. 
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occur in the MFA case similar to those already seen in the steel VER case. In 
fact, according to Tarr and Morkre’s (1984) estimates, tariff equivalents of 
MFA quotas on U.S.  imports of apparel from Hong Kong turned out to be 
20.2 percent on average in 1980. Recently, Kim et al. (1986) recalculated the 
average quota rent of apparel using the composition of Korean exports to the 
United States: it turned out to be 17 percent. According to Kim’s experiments 
with a simple model, in 1983 Korean exports of textiles and clothing to the 
U.S. market would have increased by 16.7 percent in value if the MFA quotas 
of the United States were lifted, despite the resulting export price reduction of 
17 percent for MFA-regulated products. The net welfare effect on Korea of 
the MFA quotas of the United States is unknown, however. 
Unlike the VER cases, other measures of U.S.-administered protection, di- 
rected at Korean exporters only, are not likely to affect the U.S. domestic 
prices of the concerned products in any significant way.21 This is mainly be- 
cause Korean exports constitute only a portion of U.S. consumption of the 
concerned products, and they are likely to be highly standardized, with an 
ample substitution possibility from other supply sources. Therefore, any 
price-raising effect of U.S. -administered protection could be a fatal blow to 
the Korean exporters of the concerned products, and any reduction of Korean 
exports could be readily replaced by increased domestic production or imports 
from other competitors, leaving the domestic prices and quantity consumed in 
the United States relatively intact. In such cases, the welfare loss borne by 
Korean exporters due to U. S .-administered protection will be directly propor- 
tional to the extent of their export loss in the U.S. market. Korean exporters 
facing this type of U. S. -administered protection, therefore, will make an extra 
effort to divert their exports to third-country markets, in order to maintain a 
certain operational rate and salvage some of their losses in the U.S. market. 
The changes in export value of goods subject to various forms of U.S.- 
administered protection, except for VERs, are summarized at an aggregate 
level in table 7. A few notable features appear. First, for all cases with all 
outcomes, export value to the U.S. market declined by 10 percentage points 
on average between the year before and the year after the initiation of the 
investigation. There is also, clearly, export diversification from the U.S. mar- 
ket to third-country markets after the initiation of the investigation. Within a 
three-year period after the initiation of the investigation, export value to third- 
country markets increased by 50 percentage points, whereas it showed only a 
5 percentage point increase during the three-year period prior to the initiation 
21. According to an estimate by Messerlin (1988, 36), when facing AD measures by the EC, 
exports from NIEs do not enjoy any price increases, whereas exports from industrialized countries 
enjoy a 12 percent price increase. 
22. Table 7.10 and tables 7.11 and 7.12 below are based on export value data classified by 
Korean CCCN or HS codes, which were converted from the U.S. import trade codes by the Korea 
Foreign Trade Association. Hence, errors might have been committed in calculating export values 
to the extent that Korean CCCN or HS codes do not match the U.S. International Trade Classifi- 
cation codes. 
Table 7.10 Effects of U.S.-Administered Protection on Korean Exports, 1980-88 (%) 
t - 3  1 - 2  1 - 1  I t + l  r + 2  t i - 3  
All cases with all outcomes 
(50 cases): . 
Exports to the U.S.  
Exports to third countries 
Exports to all countries 
Cases with affirmative 
determination: 
Cases with positive government 
action (10 cases): 
Exports to the U.S.  
Exports to third countries 
Exports to all countries 
56.9 75.5 103.1 100.0 93.4 115.7 125.9 
(5,806) 
95.2 99.7 97.2 100.0 123.6 141.6 150.2 
(6.084) 
78.4 87.6 104.5 100.0 113.1 128.0 131.3 
( 1  1,889) 
41.8 76.3 80.5 100.0 54.2 46.7 92.9 
(475) 
86.2 108.4 112.0 100.0 156.2 192. I 187.1 
(377) 
60.4 88.4 99.5 100.0 123.4 158.2 110.8 
(851) 
Cases with alternative 
arrangement ( 1  1 cases): 
Exports to the U.S. 
Exports to third countries 
Exports to all countries 
Cases with negative determination 
(25 cases): 
Exports to the U. S . 
Exports to third countries 
Exports to all countries 
90.3 91.9 90.9 100.0 120.2 129.8 116.7 
(2,759) 
83.1 98.2 91.3 100.0 128.8 94.7 126.2 
(2,976) 
76.1 88.6 85.8 100.0 121.0 106.6 119.4 
(5,735) 
52.2 74.9 109.8 100.0 100.7 139.1 142.4 
(2,458) 
108.9 100.7 101.6 1 0 . 0  107.5 138.8 151.1 
(2,339) 
90.5 91.4 118.0 100.0 105.8 124.4 141.8 
(4,797) 
~~ 
Source: Author’s calculation based on the trade data provided by the Korea Foreign Trade Association. 
Note: Administered protection includes here AD and CVD, Section 201, Section 337, and Section 232 cases. t = the year when 
the cases were initiated. The numbers given in parentheses represent actual export values in million U.S. dollars. 
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of the investigation. Second, a breakdown of all cases based on the final out- 
come of the investigation shows a more pronounced difference in their export 
responses. For the cases facing some form of positive action on the part of the 
U.S. government to restrict imports, for example, exports to the United States 
declined sharply, by some 50 percentage points in value, within the two years 
after the initiation of the investigation, while exports diverted to third-country 
markets from the U.S. market showed quite substantial growth. However, the 
cases facing affirmative determination but settled by alternative arrangements 
seem to have been relatively mildly affected in their exports to the United 
States. Finally, the mere threat of initiating an investigation may also have 
some effect on exports: export value declined by 10 percentage points in the 
cases with a negative final determination between the prior and the subsequent 
year of the initiation of the investigation. In this case, export value did not 
grow any in the first year after the initiation of the investigation, at a time 
when definitive measures were still not decided on. 
The various types of administered protection have very different effects on 
Korean exports, as shown in table 7.11. When the cases with a final affirma- 
tive determination, including arrangement cases, are considered, AD or safe- 
guard actions appear to have had the most significant effect on export value. 
Within one year after the initiation of the investigation, exports to the U.S. 
market declined in value by 40 percent on average in AD cases and by more 
than 50 percent in a safeguard case. However, exports to the U.S. market 
appear to have been least affected in the CVD cases and only mildly so in the 
unfair-trade-practice cases (Section 337 cases). This was, perhaps, because 
the two CVD cases considered in table 7.11 included steel products, for which 
a very low CVD rate-less than 2 percent on average-was initially applied, 
and these actions were subsequently dropped in return for the 1984 steel VER 
agreement. On the other hand, most of the Section 337 cases-six of eight 
cases facing affirmative determination-were resolved by alternative arrange- 
ments such as royalty payments and other compensation methods, rather than 
by accepting an exclusion order from the ITC. Such arrangements may not 
necessarily lead to a decrease in exports. 
The breakdown by industry of the export decline, in response to U.S.- 
administered protection, is shown in table 7.12. As can be seen, the iron and 
steel industries showed no systematic response in their exports, except for the 
first year after the initiation of the investigation. This was, perhaps, due to the 
fact that most of the charges made against the iron and steel industries were 
concentrated in the early 1980s, just before the 1984 steel VER agreement 
was reached. The metal products industry also showed an expected pattern 
of export decline in the first year after the initiation of the investigation. 
The most significant effect on exports with an expected pattern can be found 
in the electrical and electronics industry, which has emerged as the number 
one export industry of Korea in recent years. The export value of this 
industry declined by over 35 percent within the two-year period after the 
Table 7.11 Effects of U.S.-Administered Protection on Korean Exports, by Qpe of Measures: Cases with 
Affirmative Determination (%) 
1 - 3  t - 2  1 - 1  t t + l  t + 2  r + 3  
ADS (10 cases):. 
Exports to the U . S 
Exports to third countries 
Exports to all countries 
CVDs (2 cases): 
Exports to the U.S. 
Exports to third countries 
Exports to all countries 
Safeguard ( I  case): 
Exports to the U.S. 
73.6 95.8 82.3 100.0 59.7 61.1 93.1 
(822) 
71.6 97.5 120.9 100.0 151.0 180.7 207.1 
(588) 
65.9 92.9 102. I 100.0 123.0 156.3 130.5 
( 1,409) 
60.3 71.5 117.1 100.0 168.0 216.5 162.4 
(453) 
90.4 119.0 84.5 100.0 66.3 69.0 64.3 
(808) 
66.2 84.4 89.8 100.0 95.5 111.3 92.5 
(1,260) 
87.1 121.4 142.4 100.0 48.7 34.3 46.0 
(18) 
(continued) 
Table 7.11 (continued) 
~~ 
t - 3  t - 2  t - 1  r t + l  r + 2  t + 3  
Exports to third countries 376.1 345.2 21 1.9 100.0 123.1 91 .O 24.0 
Exports to all countries 188.8 200.2 166.9 100.0 74.9 54.3 38.2 
(10) 
(28) 
Unfair trade practice (8 cases):b 
Exports to the U.S. 58.5 69.1 75.6 100.0 127.1 125.2 139.5 
Exports to third countries 55.3 75.8 66.8 100.0 147.2 100.8 137.7 
Exports to all countries 57.5 10.2 71.4 100.0 135.6 111.2 138.6 
(1,941) 
(1,947) 
(3,889) 
Source: See table 7.10. 
Noret Affirmative determination includes alternative arrangements. The numbers given in parentheses represent actual export 
values in million U.S. dollars. 
"wo cases that were subject to ADS and CVDs at the same time were included in AD cases. 
bunfair trade practice refers to Section 337 cases. 
Table 7.12 Effects of US.-Administered Protection on Korean Exports to the United States, by Industry and 
Final Outcome 
1 - 3  t - 2  t - 1  t t + l  t + 2  t + 3  
Iron and steel [9]: 
Affirmative [7Ia 98.5 
Negative [2] 67.3 
Metal products [9l: 
Affirmative [3]' 51.6 
Negative [6] 49.1 
Electrical and electronics [8]: 
Affirmative [5]" 37.6 
Negative [3] 74.4 
Others [20]: 
Affirmative [6]' 63.2 
Negative [I41 46.6 
119.5 104.7 
75.3 105.4 
65.7 52.9 
47.3 50.7 
51.8 65.5 
144.7 263.4 
80.3 97.5 
71.7 102.8 
100.0 
100.0 
(127) 
(549) 
100.0 
(2,011) 
100.0 
(373) 
91.3 
109.2 
78.0 
97.6 
78.2 
124.6 
86.6 
95.7 
115.8 111.1 
89.4 82.0 
112.7 139.1 
92.2 63.0 
64.4 92.8 
228.8 
57.7 92.9 
145.8 185.0 
Source: See table 7.10. 
Note: Administered protection includes here AD and CVD, Section 201, Section 337, and Section 232 cases. The number of cases 
involved is shown in square brackets. The numbers given in parentheses represent actual export value in million U.S. dollars. 
'Affirmative determination includes alternative arrangements. 
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initiation of the investigation, for the cases faced with an affirmative determi- 
nation. A similar pattern of export responses is observed for the remaining 
industries. 
7.5 Concluding Remarks 
This paper provides evidence that recent U.S. trade policy shows a strong 
drift toward protectionist bilateralism, endangering the international trading 
system based on the GATT rules. Evidence follows both from the review of 
protectionist elements embedded in current U.S. trade laws and from the ex- 
amination of the pattern of U.S.-administered protection as applied to Korean 
exports during the 1980s. 
However, the Korean experience indicates that greater and safer access to 
the U.S. market has been critical to Korea’s economic success, and it will be 
no less so in the future, too. The key concern of Korea regarding U.S. trade 
policy is, therefore, how to help the United States stop or turn back its drift 
toward protectionist bilateralism. It appears that Korea may serve that purpose 
most effectively through the new round of multilateral trade negotiations that 
is currently under way, possibly in collaboration with other developing coun- 
tries. Several ways to do so may be suggested. 
First, Korea (or developing countries in general) should be ready to negoti- 
ate away its privilege of so-called special and differential treatment in the 
GATT-which has been largely ineffective or even served adversely in many 
developing countries by encouraging them to adopt an inward-oriented devel- 
opment path-in return for the dismantling of NTBs and protection-oriented 
legislation in the United States (or AICs). In other words, Korea (or develop- 
ing countries) would be better off accepting the principle of full reciprocity in 
return for free and secured access to the U.S. market (or AICs’ markets). The 
timetable for this to occur should be one of the main subjects of negotiation at 
the multilateral trade negotiations. 
At the same time, Korea (or developing countries) should demand the 
rewriting of the current GATT rules on the AD or CVD process, and, accord- 
ingly, of national laws, in order to better reflect the merits of modern econom- 
ics. The rules should be amended, for example, to accommodate economi- 
cally meaningful tax-cum-subsidy measures to compensate for externalities or 
other market imperfections. Also, the possibility of the abuse of such statutes 
needs to be minimized, by making the rules more strict and possibly by having 
petitioners bear at least part of the legal costs for invalid charges. 
Korea should also actively seek a multilateral agreement on the rules gov- 
erning protection of intellectual property rights so that those rights are ade- 
quately protected but at the same time the free flow of technical know-how is 
not disturbed. In recent years, the fear of abuse of Section 337 in the United 
States has been of growing concern to Korean exporters. Korea (or developing 
countries) should demand that an injury test be required before the ITC makes 
a decision about the infringement of intellectual property rights. 
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Finally, it would be in Korea’s (or developing countries’) interests for the 
escape clause of the GATT (Article XIX) to be amended by relaxing the re- 
quirement for compensation so that Section 201 can become a main route for 
temporary import relief for structural adjustment in the United States (or 
AICs). Import restrictions would be at least more transparent and nondiscri- 
minatory under Section 201 than they would be under other means of admin- 
istered protection. 
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Comment Shujiro Urata 
The purpose of Chong-Hyun Nam’s paper is twofold-to examine the chang- 
ing pattern of U.S. import protection policies and to investigate quantitatively 
the effect of such policies on Korean exports to the United States. The paper 
finds that U.S. import protection policies, mainly in the form of nontariff bar- 
riers (NTBs), were intensified in the early 1980s, when the problem of the 
U.S. trade deficit became serious. Nam argues that types of NTBs such as 
antidumping (AD) charges and countervailing duties (CVDs) are adopted in 
order to obtain voluntary export restraints (VERs), by pressuring exporting 
countries. VERs, which escape GATT illegality, are one of the most preferred 
forms of import protection as they provide benefits not only to import- 
competing producers in importing countries but also to exporters in the form 
of rents, at the cost of consumers in importing countries. 
The paper finds that the NTBs applied by the U.S. government on Korean 
exports worked effectively to reduce the volume of Korean exports to the 
United States. Facing restrictions on their exports to the U.S. market, Korean 
producers adopted mainly two measures: a shift in export destinations away 
from the U.S. market and an upgrading of exports to high-value-added items. 
On the basis of these findings, and recognizing the importance of the U.S. 
market for Korean exports, Nam presents a number of interesting and impor- 
tant policy recommendations for Korea. These recommendations may be 
grouped into two types-those that could be pursued unilaterally by Korea 
and those that seek a change in GATT trading rules and/or in U.S. trade laws. 
Among the policy recommendations included in the first group, the most 
important one is the abolishment of the special and differential treatment ex- 
tended to Korea and other developing countries in the GATT since such treat- 
ment adversely effects the economic development of these countries. As for 
changing international trading rules, the most important proposal is to revise 
tax-cum-subsidy measures to compensate for inefficiency caused by extemal- 
Shujiro Urata is associate professor of economics at Waseda University, Tokyo. 
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ities or other market imperfections, which are not regarded as ‘‘legal’’ in inter- 
national rules. Justification for such policy, according to Nam, may be found 
in the teachings of modern economics. 
The examination of changes in U.S. import protection policies was well 
conducted and the description of the findings succinct. Moreover, the method 
of analysis used to measure the effect of NTBs on exports of the targeted 
products is interesting, and the results reveal that U.S. import protection mea- 
sures were effective in limiting Korean exports in some products, as noted 
above. 
The paper addresses some of the most important trade policy issues con- 
fronting us at present: proliferation of NTBs and the problem of North-South 
trade. The findings may be regarded as evidence supporting an argument 
against import protection in the form of NTBs from the point of view not only 
of exporting countries but also of importing countries. The main problem of 
import protection is, as correctly argued by Nam, its retardation effect on 
industrial transformation, which in turn deters the economic growth of both 
exporting and importing countries. 
Although I agree with most of the arguments presented by Nam for the 
liberalization of foreign trade, I have different opinions on a few points. The 
first is Nam’s suggestion for the revision of tax-cum-subsidy measures in 
the GATT and U.S. trade rules. While in theory tax-cum-subsidy measures 
may be justified to correct for the problems caused by market imperfections, 
the application of such measures is not without difficulties. Take the case of 
scale economies, for example, which is usually considered as warranting gov- 
ernment intervention. Production subsidy for an industry subject to scale 
economies such as chemicals is often argued to be justified in order to over- 
come the infant stage and to achieve a minimum efficient scale of production. 
However, there are potential problems with the application of such measures. 
First, it is not so simple to identify the presence of scale economies in produc- 
tion, let alone the level of production corresponding to the minimum efficient 
scale. Second, such measures may provoke retaliation from trading partners, 
thereby leading to trade wars. Finally, rents may be created, with the result 
that removal of the subsidy may become difficult when such action is called 
for. 
I now turn to a point that I think needs some empirical evidence in order to 
justify the argument. Referring to AD charges caused by lower export prices 
in relation to domestic prices, Nam asserts that, even in such cases, foreign 
competitors are not harmed because the export price is normally set at least at 
or above international levels. This observation must be supported by empirical 
evidence. In addition, this assertion points to the existence of import barriers 
in exporting countries because, without such barriers, exporters cannot main- 
tain higher prices in the local market. Accordingly, import liberalization in 
developing countries may be called for. 
Turning to the effect on Korean exports of U.S. import protection policies 
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against Korean exports, Nam identifies a shift in export destinations and a 
quality upgrading of exports. I would be interested to know the effect of these 
changes on Korean foreign investment. As is often pointed out, faced with 
similar restrictions, Japanese producers shifted their location of production 
from Japan to the United States and to other countries that were free from such 
restrictions. This type of reaction from Korean producers may not have been 
so prevalent yet; however, such corporate strategy is likely to be carried out 
more actively in the future. 
Finally, a few observations on the issue of trade liberalization, especially in 
relation to the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations are in order. 
The world is currently witnessing new and contrasting developments in the 
orientation of international trade policies pursued by developed countries, on 
the one hand, and by developing countries, on the other. Developed countries, 
especially those in Western Europe and North America, have been actively 
adopting protectionist policies since the mid- 1970s, which had been preceded 
by substantial liberalization since the end of World War 11. In contrast, the 
number of developing countries adopting liberalization policies has increased 
since the mid- 1980s. Developing countries opened up their economies not 
only because of the pressure by developed countries but also because of their 
recognition that such policies would improve resource allocation, thereby in- 
creasing their exports and outputs as well as their consumers’ welfare. 
Recognizing the fact that developing countries, which were opposed to lib- 
eralization, are finally ready to open up their markets, the world must not miss 
this opportunity to promote expansion of world trade, which would lead to 
further expansion of the world economy. The results of Nam’s analysis indi- 
cate clearly the unfavorable effect of protectionism by developed countries on 
developing countries, and in his paper Nam suggested proposals that could be 
carried out by developing countries. What is needed now is to convince devel- 
oped countries of the unfavorable effect of protectionism on their economic 
performance. For that purpose, a detailed analysis of the effect of protection- 
ism, in particular that in the form of NTBs, on developed countries is re- 
quired. 
Comment Chia Siow Yue 
This is an excellent and highly informative paper. My comments are on three 
aspects of Chong-Hyun Nam’s presentation, namely, the characteristics of 
U.S.-Korea bilateral trade, the rise in bilateral trade friction, and Korean pol- 
icy responses. 
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First, since Korea embarked on export-oriented industrialization in the 
1960s, it has been and remains extremely dependent on the U.S. market. Bi- 
lateral trade has seen very rapid growth, but Korea remains a relatively small 
market for U.S. exports. As noted by Nam, this asymmetry in bilateral trade 
also characterizes U.S. trade relations with the other Asian newly industrial- 
ized economies (NIEs). This has led to unequal bargaining strength in trade 
negotiations, much to the aggravation of Korea (and other Asian NIEs). 
Second, the growing trade deficit of the United States with Korea and the 
latter’s growing competitiveness in high-tech sectors has led to a rise in trade 
friction as the United States seeks to redress Korean “unfair” trade practices, 
achieve greater access to the Korean market, and protect its intellectual prop- 
erty. The United States is no longer a benevolent hegemonic power and trad- 
ing partner but is increasingly insisting on a level playing field. Korean ex- 
ports to the United States are increasingly subject to U.S. NTBs and no longer 
eligible for GSP (Generalized System of Preferences) benefits, and the United 
States has demanded that Korea improve its enforcement of intellectual prop- 
erty rights and appreciate its currency. While Nam’s paper emphasizes the 
negative developments in U.S. trade policy, it should also be noted that many 
restrictive U.S. trade practices were adopted in response to the perception that 
Korea has been guilty of “unfair” trade practices in the first place. It should 
also be noted that, in spite of these U.S. measures, Korean exports to the 
United States have continued to maintain high levels of growth, as Korean 
exporters diversify and upgrade. And while Korea (and other Asian NIEs) 
complain about the growth of protectionist measures by the United States, 
they face even more difficulties in penetrating the markets of Western Europe 
and Japan. Korea and the other Asian NIEs cannot expect to continue to de- 
pend heavily on the U.S. market and record growing surpluses. Bilateral trade 
will have to be more balanced to avoid further U. S.  trade policy offensives. 
Third, the final section of Nam’s paper focuses on Korea’s strategy in 
GATT to promote multilateralism and to reverse U.S. protectionist bilateral- 
ism. I would like to expand on this and discuss in broader terms the Korean 
policy responses to U.S. pressure for a level playing field as well as to domes- 
tic developments. Korea is rapidly undertaking structural adjustments, mak- 
ing trade policy changes, and seeking outward investments. There is less em- 
phasis on government intervention in industrial and export targeting, a 
reflection of the adverse experience in the 1970s in promoting heavy and 
chemical industries, and a greater emphasis on promotion of domestic re- 
search and development to offset the problem of technology acquisition and 
on the promotion of small and medium-sized enterprises to promote equity 
and countervail the power of business conglomerates. In an effort to ensure 
continuing market access for its exports, Korea has resorted to the use of 
lobbyists and economic diplomacy. It is not clear, however, whether the use of 
paid lobbyists in the United States has been effective; critics argue that Ko- 
rea’s lobbying efforts have not been as effective as those of Japan and Taiwan. 
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In GATT negotiations, Korea appears prepared to give up the privilege of 
special and differential treatment and accept the principle of full reciprocity. It 
is also participating actively in Asia-Pacific forums such as the Pacific Eco- 
nomic Cooperation Conference (PECC) and the Asia-Pacific Economic Con- 
ference (APEC). Korea has also embarked on import liberalization and the 
enforcement of intellectual property rights, policy changes facilitated by the 
improved current account balance and by domestic inflationary pressures. It 
should be noted, however, that import liberalization by Korea will not neces- 
sarily improve U.S. export competitiveness and the bilateral trade balance. To 
ensure that its market-opening measures will benefit the United States, Korea 
has thus resorted to buying missions in the United States, and giving prefer- 
ential market access to U.S. industries. However, there is a Korean perception 
that its efforts at import liberalization are not appreciated by the United States. 
Korea is also emphasizing further market and product diversification-market 
diversification to the EC, Japan, other Asian NIEs, and developing countries 
and reduced product concentration through technological upgrading and a 
shift to the production of parts and components. Finally, Korea has embarked 
on defensive outward investment-in the United States and other industrial 
countries, to counter the growing trade friction and to gain access to technol- 
ogy-and in Southeast Asia and other developing countries, in order to re- 
main cost competitive in the face of rapidly rising domestic wages and cur- 
rency appreciation. 
